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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
v. 
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-
Respondent, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NO. 38554 
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2010-16895 
DARREN DUSTIN CARMOUCHE, ) RESPONDENT'S/CROSS-APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ) 
Defendant-Respondent/ Cross- ) 
Appellant. ) 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Darren Dustin Carmouche asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion 
of the Idaho Court of Appeals, 2013 Opinion No. 62 (Ct. App. 2013) (hereinafter, 
Opinion). In Mr. Carmouche's cross-appeal1, he asserted that the prosecutor at his trial 
1 The State originally filed a separate cross-appeal of the district court's acquittal of the 
persistent violator sentencing enhancement that was alleged at trial. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals dismissed the State's appeal as moot based upon Double Jeopardy grounds. 
(Opinion, pp.4-10.) The State has not sought review from this Court on the Idaho Court 
of Appeals' dismissal of its own appeal. 
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committed prosecutorial misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error, when the 
prosecutor argued that evidence of his assertion of his Fourth Amendment rights as 
substantive evidence of his guilt. The Court of Appeals assumed constitutional error 
that was plain from the record for purposes of its opinion, but found this error to be 
harmless. (Opinion, pp.10-12.) 
However, in so doing, the Court of Appeals' prejudice analysis relied partially on 
other evidence that, "showed that Carmouche did not want the police to see or contact 
the victim," rather than focusing on other evidence - aside from a lack of desire to 
interact with police - that would tend to establish Mr. Carmouche's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. (Opinion, p.12.) In essence, the Court of Appeals cited to other 
evidence that showed an unwillingness to speak to police as evidence of guilt, which is 
as much constitutional error as citing to an express invocation of one's Fourth or Fifth 
Amendment rights. Mr. Carmouche further submits that the remaining evidence relied 
on by the Court of Appeals in finding the error harmless was not sufficient to establish 
that the error did not contribute to Mr. Carmouche's verdicts. Because the prejudice 
analysis undertaken by the Court of Appeals in this case was not the proper analysis 
articulated under this Court's previous opinion in State v. Perry, Mr. Carmouche 
respectfully asks that this Court grant his petition for review and vacate his judgments of 
conviction and sentences. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Darren Carmouche was charged with attempted strangulation, second degree 
kidnapping, aggravated battery, and felony domestic violence. (R., pp.32-34, 57-59.) 
The State subsequently alleged four separate sentencing enhancements - three 
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persistent violator sentencing enhancements for the charges of attempted strangulation, 
kidnapping, and domestic violence, as well as an allegation that Mr. Carmouche used or 
attempted to use a deadly weapon during the commission of the alleged aggravated 
battery. (R., pp.41-43.) The State subsequently amended its allegations of sentencing 
enhancements to reflect four allegations that Mr. Carmouche was a persistent violator. 
(R., pp.60-64.) 
At the jury trial in this case, the State presented the testimony of the alleged 
victim, Kirsteen Redmond. (Trial Tr.2, p.71, Ls.12-15.) She testified that, at the time of 
the alleged altercation, she and Mr. Carmouche were living together. (Trial Tr., p. 71, 
Ls.16-23.) Ms. Redmond testified that, on that day, she and Mr. Carmouche were using 
methamphetamine and had been for several days. (Trial Tr., p.73, Ls.6-10, p.109, Ls.1-
5.) She claimed that she and Mr. Carmouche began fighting while high on 
methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.74, Ls.6-8.) The fight, according to Ms. Redmond, was 
based upon Mr. Carmouche's belief that she was having an affair with a man that the 
two of them worked with. (Trial Tr., p.74, Ls.9-12.) According to Ms. Redmond's 
testimony, the fight turned physical. (Trial Tr., p.74, Ls.17-23.) 
Ms. Redmond testified that, when Mr. Carmouche was dissatisfied with the 
answers she was giving him to his questions about whether she was involved with this 
man, he started punching her in the face. (Trial Tr., p. 7 4, L.19 - p. 75, L.9.) By her 
estimate at trial, Mr. Carmouche punched her over 50 times throughout the fight. (Trial 
Tr., p. 76, Ls.10-21.) She then claimed that Mr. Carmouche grabbed her head and 
2 For ease of reference, citations to the primary transcript of the trial proceedings in this 
case are made herein by reference to "Trial Tr." All other citations to the transcript are 
made by reference to the date of the proceeding transcribed. 
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slammed it into a wall, and then hit her in the chest and legs with the handle of a 
baseball bat. (Trial Tr., p.76, L.22 - p.78, L.7.) Ms. Redmond also testified that 
Mr. Carmouche grabbed her around the throat with both hands and choked her. (Trial 
Tr., p.78, L.16- p.79, L.3.) When asked why she did not leave during the course of this 
fight, Ms. Redmond responded that Mr. Carmouche continually positioned himself 
between her and the door and threatened to kill her. (Trial Tr., p.79, Ls.7-15.) She 
further claimed that Mr. Carmouche threatened to kill her and her children if 
Ms. Redmond called the police. (Trial Tr., p.81, Ls.6-13.) 
Ms. Redmond testified that, after the fight stopped, Mr. Carmouche made her 
some food and attempted to tend to her wounds. (Trial Tr., p.81, L.24 - p.82, L.4.) 
When police arrived later, she testified that she pretended to be asleep at first. (Trial 
Tr., p.85, L.19 - p.86, L.1.) According to Ms. Redmond's testimony, Mr. Carmouche 
had pulled the blanket over her head to cover her completely when police began 
knocking on the door and instructed her to feign sleep. (Trial Tr., p.86, Ls.2-9.) 
Ms. Redmond admitted that she did not initially tell police officers that her injuries 
were caused by Mr. Carmouche upon eventually speaking to police. (Trial Tr., p.87, 
Ls.3-5.) She claimed that she first told police that she was injured falling down the 
stairs, then claimed that "people" had caused her injuries without specifying who. (Trial 
Tr., p.87, Ls.6-18.) Eventually, however, Ms. Redmond told police that Mr. Carmouche 
was the person who inflicted her injuries. (Trial Tr., p.89, Ls.14-25.) Ms. Redmond 
testified that her injuries included swelling around her face and ears, bruising all over 
her face, blood coming from her ear, some cuts on her scalp, chest pain, and a large 
bruise on her left thigh. (Trial Tr., p.90, Ls.6-13.) Ms. Redmond also testified that she 
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had a fractured rib. (Trial Tr., p.124, Ls.8-11.) She further testified that, following the 
alleged strangulation, her throat was tender, she had difficulty swallowing, and her voice 
was raspy for several weeks after that. (Trial Tr., p.93, Ls.1-18.) 
With regard to her questioning by police, Ms. Redmond acknowledged that she 
was interrogated by two police officers for approximately an hour before claiming that 
Mr. Carmouche had harmed her. (Trial Tr., p.118, L.9 - p.119, L.25.) During this 
questioning, officers repeatedly suggested to Ms. Redmond that Mr. Carmouche was 
the source of her injuries. (Trial Tr., p.119, Ls.12-25.) She also testified that the officers 
made comments that Mr. Carmouche treated Ms. Redmond worse than their dog and 
that Mr. Carmouche could come back to kill her unless she told police that he harmed 
her. (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.9-18.) However, Ms. Redmond denied that her accusations 
against Mr. Carmouche were the product of police coercion. (Trial Tr., p.125, L.21 -
p.126, L.7.) 
The State also presented the testimony of several law enforcement officers who 
were involved in the investigation of the charged offenses. First, the State presented 
the testimony of Officer Steven Uriguen of the Nampa Police Department. (Trial 
Tr., p.28, Ls.7-11.) Officer Uriguen was on patrol on the morning of the alleged 
altercation when he received a call for him to perform a welfare check regarding a 
potentially suicidal person. (Trial Tr., p.31, L.1 - p.32, L.7.) After unsuccessfully trying 
to find the man who placed a call to a suicide hotline, who Officer Uriguen knew as 
"Darren", the officer arrived at Mr. Carmouche's residence. (Trial Tr., p.32, L.2 - p.34, 
L.13.) 
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The officer initially received no response when he knocked on Mr. Carmouche's 
door. (Trial Tr., p.34, Ls.14-20.) After knocking harder, Officer Uriguen heard a male 
voice inside the home call out that everything was fine and the officer could leave. (Trial 
Tr., p.34, L.21 - p.35, L.5.) But Officer Uriguen told the man inside, subsequently 
identified as Mr. Carmouche, that he was not going to leave until the officer could verify 
that Mr. Carmouche was alright. Officer Uriguen further told Mr. Carmouche that the 
officer would break the door down if Mr. Carmouche did not come outside. (Trial 
Tr., p.35, L.22 - p.36, L.5.) 
Mr. Carmouche then came out of his house to talk with the officers outside of his 
house. (Trial Tr., p.36, Ls.14-19.) Mr. Carmouche informed the police that he had 
called the suicide hotline, and explained that he was upset due to some individuals 
having "hit on" his girlfriend. (Trial Tr., p.37, Ls.16-24.) During Officer Uriguen's 
testimony, the prosecutor questioned the officer about the fact that Mr. Carmouche 
initially did not permit police to look into or enter his home during the initial point of his 
being questioned and that he had invoked his Fourth Amendment rights in the process. 
(Trial Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.39, L.1.) 
Although Mr. Carmouche expressed to the officers that he did not wish them to 
enter his house, he did allow Officer Uriguen to open the front door and call out to 
Ms. Redmond. (Trial Tr., p.38, L.20 - p.39, L.3.) The prosecutor again elicited further 
testimony from Officer Uriguen regarding Mr. Carmouche not permitting officers to enter 
his home. (Trial Tr., p.39, Ls.4-14.) Eventually, the officer convinced Mr. Carmouche to 
permit Officer Uriguen to stick his head in the doorway to try to talk to Ms. Redmond. 
(Trial Tr., p.39, Ls.9-14.) 
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After the officer again called out to Ms. Redmond and received no response, 
Officer Uriguen convinced Mr. Carmouche to allow him to put more of his body inside 
the house to check for Ms. Redmond. (Trial Tr., p.39, L.19 - p.40, L.9.) From this 
vantage, Officer Uriguen testified that he could observe disarray in the living room, 
along Ms. Redmond, who was lying on the couch with her back to the officer. (Trial 
Tr., p.40, Ls.4-15.) Officer Uriguen once again told Ms. Redmond that she needed to 
come outside and talk to the officers. (Trial Tr., p.40, Ls.19-25.) 
Ms. Redmond did not respond at first to the officer's commands. (Trial Tr., p.41, 
Ls.1-2.) Mr. Carmouche then began to encourage Ms. Redmond to come outside and 
speak with police. (Trial Tr., p.41, Ls.3-8.) After a time, Ms. Redmond came outside of 
the house wrapped in a blanket. (Trial Tr., p.41, Ls.9-12.) When she came outside, 
Officer Uriguen testified that he observed a large bruise over Ms. Redmond's left and 
right eyes, along with dried blood on her face and a scratch on her chest. (Trial 
Tr., p.41, Ls.13-18.) Later, the officer saw a large bruise on Ms. Redmond's leg. (Trial 
Tr., p.43, Ls.13-17.) 
Because there were several officers at the scene, Officer Uriguen had two other 
officers wait outside with Mr. Carmouche, and then the officer went inside the house to 
question Ms. Redmond about her injuries. (Trial Tr., p.41, L.25 - p.42, L.20.) After 
talking with her for about an hour, Officer Uriguen called for paramedics to treat 
Ms. Redmond's injuries. (Trial Tr., p.42, L.21 - p.43, L.12.) The officer then questioned 
Mr. Carmouche briefly. (Trial Tr., p.50, Ls.14-20.) Although Mr. Carmouche did not 
initially reveal that Ms. Redmond was injured or explain how she was injured, he 
eventually stated that someone else had caused her injuries. (Trial Tr., p.50, L.21 -
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p.51, L.4.) Officer Uriguen also received permission from Ms. Redmond to search the 
home. Inside, he found numerous items scattered around, as well as broken items, and 
a hole in one of the walls with what appeared to be blood nearby. (Trial Tr., p.44, L.15 -
p.45, L.22.) Additionally, Officer Uriguen located a baseball bat in an upstairs room and 
saw clumps of hair in a bathroom garbage can. (Trial Tr., p.45, L.23 - p.46, L.3.) 
Although the apartment looked to be in disarray, the officer could not testify as to 
whether this was the condition of the apartment at any time prior to the morning of the 
alleged altercation. (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.19-22.) He also did not see any bloody rags, 
clothing, or signs of blood in any sink other than the small drop of what the officer 
believed to be blood near a hole in the wall. (Trial Tr., p.62, L.4 - p.64, L.21.) 
Sergeant Mike Wagoner of the Nampa Police Department also testified on behalf 
of the State. (Trial Tr., p.129, Ls.11-13.) As with Officer Uriguen, Sergeant Wagoner 
responded to Mr. Carmouche's home on the morning of the alleged altercation. (Trial 
Tr., p.134, Ls.10-17.) When the officer arrived at the scene, officers were already 
standing outside with Mr. Carmouche. (Trial Tr., p.135, L.10 - p.136, L.18.) 
Mr. Carmouche did not appear to be agitated or aggressive toward the officers, and 
Sergeant Wagoner could not observe any marks or blood stains on him anywhere. 
(Trial Tr., p.152, Ls.7-19.) 
Shorty thereafter, Sergeant Wagoner testified that his attention was diverted 
when Ms. Redmond also came out of the house. (Trial Tr., pp.9-18.) The officer 
testified that Ms. Redmond was walking slowly out of the apartment, as though she 
were in pain. (Trial Tr., p.318, Ls.11-17.) He also saw that her face was swollen and 
bruised. (Trial Tr., p.139, Ls.4-15.) Given her observable injuries, Sergeant Wagoner 
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and Officer Uriguen took Ms. Redmond inside the home to question her. (Trial 
Tr., p.139, L.24 - p.140, L.3.) This questioning took over an hour. (Trial Tr., p.140, 
Ls.4-6.) 
During this questioning, Sergeant Wagoner testified that Ms. Redmond informed 
him that she had been struck by a bat. (Trial Tr., p.141, Ls.7-8.) Based on this, the 
officer located a baseball bat in an upstairs bedroom which Ms. Redmond stated was 
the bat that she had been hit with. (Trial Tr., p.141, L.6 - p.144, L.6.) The officer 
additionally testified that Ms. Redmond claimed that Mr. Carmouche slammed her head 
into a wall. (Trial Tr., p.145, Ls.5-9.) Sergeant Wagoner testified that he examined the 
wall in the kitchen, where Ms. Redmond claimed that this occurred, and that he did find 
a hole in the wall that was approximately the same height as Ms. Redmond's head. 
(Trial Tr., p.145, Ls.5-18.) 
Another of the officers who responded to Mr. Carmouche's residence, Officer 
John Weirum, also testified at trial. (Trial Tr., p.176, Ls.7-12.) Officer Weirum is a crime 
scene investigator who was called to Mr. Carmouche's home. (Trial Tr., p.176, L.16 -
p.178, L.17.) After initially waiting outside with Mr. Carmouche for over an hour, Officer 
Weirum walked through the house to videotape various items of interest. (Trial 
Tr., p.181, L.23 - p.183, L.5.) Among the items noted by the officer in his testimony 
were a small baseball bat that had been removed from an upstairs bedroom, a couple of 
clumps of hair on an ottoman and on the floor of the living room, and a small amount of 
what appeared to be blood in the kitchen. (Trial Tr., p.183, L.19 - p.184, L.16.) 
However, Officer Weirum was unable to say whether the swabs taken of what appeared 
to be blood were ever actually tested. (Trial Tr., p.190, Ls.5-15.) 
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On cross-examination, Officer Weirum testified that he had never been in 
Mr. Carmouche's apartment prior to the morning following the alleged altercation, and 
therefore could not say what the condition of the apartment had been before entering it. 
(Trial Tr., p.197, L.22 - p.198, L.5.) The officer further acknowledged that he was not 
aware of any testing for blood or fingerprints of any items within the home. (Trial 
Tr., p.199, Ls.11-16.) Officer Weirum also did not recall seeing any injuries on 
Mr. Carmouche during the time he was outside of the residence on that morning. (Trial 
Tr., p.203, Ls.16-18.) 
Detective Troy Hale was the next witness presented by the State. (Trial 
Tr., p.222, L.24 - p.223, L.3.) Detective Hale interviewed Mr. Carmouche at the police 
station. (Trial Tr., p.225, L.13 - p.226, L.14.) According to the detective, when asked 
how Ms. Redmond acquired her injuries, Mr. Carmouche stated that he thought she had 
left the apartment in the middle of the night and came home injured. (Trial Tr., p.227, 
Ls.2-11.) When asked who he thought injured Ms. Redmond, Mr. Carmouche 
responded that he suspected two of his co-workers, but would not tell Detective Hale 
the names of these men. (Trial Tr., p.228, Ls.11-21.) According to the detective's 
testimony, Mr. Carmouche was skeptical when told that Ms. Redmond had told police 
that he was the source of her injuries. (Trial Tr., p.229, L.21 - p.230, L.9.) However, he 
admitted on cross-examination that Mr. Carmouche did not appear to be aggressive or 
angry towards Detective Hale during the interview. (Trial Tr., p.236, L.14 - p.237, L.15.) 
Finally, the State presented the testimony of Detective Angela Weekes of the 
Nampa Police Department. (Trial Tr., p.244, Ls.7-16.) As the primary investigator in 
Mr. Carmouche's case, Detective Weekes was responsible for making decisions as to 
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how the investigation would proceed. (Trial Tr., p.280, Ls.19-24.) In this capacity, 
Ms. Weekes testified that she decided not to forensically test any material suspected of 
being blood, and not to test the baseball bat recovered by police for finger prints. (Trial 
Tr., p.282, L.10-p.283, L.10.) She testified that she did not do so because none of the 
information received by police from either Mr. Carmouche or Ms. Redmond indicated 
that any individuals other than those two had been present in the home. (Trial 
Tr., p.283, L.19 - p.284, L.3.) 
However, on cross-examination, Detective Weekes admitted she was aware that 
Ms. Redmond had, at one point, made statements that other people had been the ones 
to have perpetrated the assault against her. (Trial Tr., p.285, Ls.3-8.) The detective 
further acknowledged that evidence of another person's fingerprints on the bat could be 
exculpatory evidence. (Trial Tr., p.285, Ls.9-14.) Additionally, Detective Weekes 
testified that x-ray examinations of Mr. Carmouche's hands did not reveal any evidence 
of injuries, despite Ms. Redmond's claim that he had punched her more than 50 times 
over the course of several hours. (Trial Tr., p.286, L.10 - p.287, L.1.) 
In addition to these officers, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Mark 
Burriesci, who was an emergency room physician who attended to Ms. Redmond's 
injuries. (Trial Tr., p.163, L.7 - p.165, L.9.) Dr. Burriesci testified that Ms. Redmond 
had bruising on her left ear, the left side of her face, and on the back of her head. (Trial 
Tr., p.168, Ls.12-18.) There was also bruising around her eyes and lacerations on her 
lip and right ear, along with a fractured tooth. (Trial Tr., p.168, Ls.16-21.) Dr. Burriesci 
testified that Ms. Redmond also had abrasions on her neck and complained of chest 
discomfort. (Trial Tr., p.168, Ls.22-24.) An x-ray revealed that one of Ms. Redmond's 
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ribs was fractured. (Trial Tr., p.169, Ls.15-25.) The doctor testified that Ms. Redmond 
also had scattered bruising throughout her body. (Trial Tr., p.168, L.25 - p.169, L.8.) 
Following the presentation of the State's evidence, Mr. Carmouche presented the 
testimony of his alibi witness, Richard Damore. (Trial Tr., p.293, Ls.14-16.) He testified 
that he was a friend of Mr. Carmouche. (Trial Tr., p.294, Ls.3-13.) According to 
Mr. Damore, Mr. Carmouche was with him at the time of the charged offenses. (Trial 
Tr., p.294, L.21 - p.295, L.2.) He testified that he had picked Mr. Carmouche up a 
couple of days before the charged offenses. According to Mr. Damore's testimony, he 
saw Ms. Redmond on the morning he picked up Mr. Carmouche, and she had no 
observable injuries at that time. (Trial Tr., p.295, L.3 - p.296, L.6.) He then drove 
Mr. Carmouche back to the place where he was staying at the time - in a shed behind a 
house - where the two men did methamphetamine over the course of the next two 
days. (Trial Tr., p.296, L.7 - p.299, L.3.) 
Mr. Damore testified that, upon returning to Mr. Carmouche's home, the 
residence was in a state of disarray and Ms. Redmond looked "battered." (Trial 
Tr., p.299, L.10 - p.300, L.4.) Ms. Redmond was also very angry with Mr. Carmouche 
for being gone. (Trial Tr., p.299, L.21 - p.300, L.4.) Given the fact that Ms. Redmond 
looked injured, coupled with her angry response towards Mr. Carmouche, Mr. Damore 
then left Mr. Carmouche's home. (Trial Tr., p.300, Ls.5-15.) 
Mr. Damore did admit that, in addition to being close friends with Mr. Carmouche, 
the two were also incarcerated together prior to his trial. (Trial Tr., p.298, Ls.7-11, 
p.303, Ls.7-21.) He denied that he and Mr. Carmouche discussed Mr. Carmouche's 
pending charges while they were incarcerated. (Trial Tr., p.303, L.12 - p.304, L.9.) 
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Mr. Damore further claimed that no one witnessed Mr. Carmouche during the time that 
Mr. Carmouche was staying with Mr. Damore. (Trial Tr., p.304, Ls.18-21.) This 
included the woman who owned the home behind which they were staying. (Trial 
Tr., p.306, Ls.12-16.) In addition, Mr. Damore denied that Mr. Carmouche had sought 
to induce him to testify falsely in Mr. Carmouche's trial. (Trial Tr., p.312, L.22 - p.315, 
L.10.) 
Mr. Carmouche also testified on his own behalf. (Trial Tr., p.326, Ls.8-13.) He 
testified, as was testified by Mr. Damore, that he was with Mr. Damore at the time of the 
alleged offenses; and that he only became aware of Ms. Redmond's injuries upon 
returning home thereafter. (Trial Tr., p.326, L.21 - p.328, L.12.) Mr. Carmouche 
testified that Ms. Redmond was very angry that he had not been home, and Mr. Damore 
left because of this. (Trial Tr., p.329, Ls.5-23.) According to Mr. Carmouche's 
testimony, Ms. Redmond told him that, on the prior evening, she had invited two other 
men over while he was gone and she was injured by them. (Trial Tr., p.330, Ls.13-18.) 
Although he tried to get Ms. Redmond to go to police several times, Mr. Carmouche 
testified that this did not happen. (Trial Tr., p.330, L.25 - p.331, L.7.) Eventually, he 
and Ms. Redmond argued. (Trial Tr., p.331, Ls.8-20.) Mr. Carmouche testified that he 
called a suicide hotline as a result of this argument. (Trial Tr., p.331, L.21 - p.332, 
L.16.) Mr. Carmouche denied having struck, choked, or threatened Ms. Redmond. 
(Trial Tr., p.335, Ls.9-25.) He further testified that he had lied to police when he claimed 
to have been home the previous night - according to Mr. Carmouche, he was worried 
about the potential consequences of his drug use and therefore lied because he was 
scared. (Trial Tr., p.336, L.12 - p.337, L.10.) 
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On cross-examination, the State questioned Mr. Carmouche about the 
inconsistencies between his trial testimony and his prior statements to police, as well as 
his failure to provide police with the alibi that he testified to at trial. (Trial Tr., p.349, L.23 
- p.355, L.1.) Mr. Carmouche also admitted that he had sent Ms. Redmond a letter 
while incarcerated in which he apologized to her. (Trial Tr., p.355, Ls.9-22.) 
Mr. Carmouche claimed that he apologized to Ms. Redmond out of guilt for not having 
been there at the time she was injured. (Trial Tr., p.359, L.15 - p.360, L.6.) 
The State then called a rebuttal witness to the stand, Andrea Deaugustineo. 
(Trial Tr., p.367, Ls.16-17.) Ms. Deaugustineo owned the home where Mr. Damore 
claimed to have been staying with Mr. Carmouche at the time of the alleged offenses. 
(Trial Tr., p.367, Ls.20-21.) While she acknowledged that Mr. Damore stayed behind 
her house in a shed, Ms. Deaugustineo denied that she had ever seen Mr. Carmouche 
there. (Trial Tr., p.368, L.14 - p.370, L.6.) 
During closing arguments, the State referenced the fact that Mr. Carmouche 
closed the door behind him when he first went outside his home to talk to police. (Trial 
Tr., p.378, Ls.6-7.) The prosecutor then continued: 
When they asked about his girlfriend he had a fight with, well, she's 
asleep. You can't see her. I know my rights. You can't go in. Why? 
Why, if he came home and found her beaten this way and heard 
these stories? Would that be your response? 
(Trial Tr., p.378, Ls.8-12 (emphasis added).) 
The jury convicted Mr. Carmouche of attempted strangulation, kidnapping, 
aggravated battery, and felony domestic battery. (Trial Tr., p.410, L.24 - p.411, L.8; 
R., pp.133-135.) Thereafter, Mr. Carmouche proceeded to a bench trial on the State's 
persistent violator allegations. (11/12/10 Tr., p.1, Ls.5-20.) During this trial, the State 
14 
presented evidence of Mr. Carmouche's driver's license, and attempted to put into 
evidence an ILETS report regarding his driver's license information that included his 
social security number. (11/20/10 Tr., p.20, L.7 - p.31, L.10.) Although the officer 
testifying for the State claimed that she was familiar with how to run a criminal history 
check using this program, she admitted that she was not the custodian of these records, 
these records were not kept by the Nampa Police Department itself, and the officer was 
not even familiar with what the acronym "ILETS" stood for. (11/20/10 Tr., p.32, L.3 -
p.33, L.17.) Although Mr. Carmouche did not object to the prior testimony during which 
the officer recited what the !LETS report indicated his social security number to be, the 
State's request for the admission of the ILETS report itself was withdrawn by the State 
in the face of Mr. Carmouche's hearsay objection. (11/20/10 Tr., p.31, L.4 - p.35, L.5.) 
Following the presentation of the State's evidence, the district court determined 
that the State had "barely" met its burden of establishing the prior convictions necessary 
to sustain the State's persistent violator allegations. (11/20/10 Tr., p.60, Ls.13-19.) The 
trial court then indicated its intent to enter a judgment reflecting such. (11/20/10 
Tr., p.60, Ls.13-19.) 
However, no such judgment or order was ever entered. Instead, the district court 
subsequently entered a written order of its factual findings and legal conclusion that 
Mr. Carmouche was not a persistent violator of the law. (R., pp.156-162.) After 
reviewing the testimony and evidence presented, the district court determined that its 
prior consideration of the officer's testimony as to the contents of the ILETS report was 
in error. (R., p.156.) The district court ultimately held that the State had not presented 
sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Carmouche's identity as the subject of the prior 
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alleged felony convictions. (R., pp.158-162.) Accordingly, the district court entered an 
order acquitting Mr. Carmouche of these allegations. (R., pp.162, 180-181.) 
Mr. Carmouche was sentenced to 15 years, with four years fixed, for each of his 
convictions of attempted strangulation, second degree kidnapping, and aggravated 
battery. For his conviction of domestic battery with traumatic injury, Mr. Carmouche 
received a sentence of 10 years, with six years fixed. (6/20/11 Tr., p.54, L.15 - p.55, 
L.6; R., pp.299-300.) Each of these sentences was ordered to run concurrently. 
(6/20/11 Tr., p.55, Ls. 7-8; R., p.300.) 
The State filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's judgment of 
acquittal on the persistent violator sentencing enhancement allegation. (R., p.212.) 
Mr. Carmouche likewise timely appealed from his judgments of conviction and 
sentences. (R., p.309.) 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that the relief sought by the State in 
its appeal - i.e. a retrial or entry of a judgment of conviction on the persistent violator 
allegation - was barred under the operation of the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth 
Amendment given the trial court's factual acquittal of Mr. Carmouche on this allegation. 
(Opinion, pp.4-10.) With respect to Mr. Carmouche's claim of prosecutorial misconduct, 
the Court of Appeals assumed both that constitutional error had been established and 
that this error was plain from the record. (Opinion, pp.10-12.) However, the Court of 
Appeals deemed this error to be harmless. (Opinion, p.12.) This petition for review 
timely followed. 
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ISSUE 
Should this Court grant Mr. Carmouche's petition for review and reverse his judgments 
of conviction and sentences because the prosecutor committed misconduct, rising to 
the level of a fundamental error, when the prosecutor argued evidence of 
Mr. Carmouche's refusal to permit police to enter his home as supporting an inference 
of guilt of the charged offenses? 
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ARGUMENT 
This Court Should Grant Mr. Carmouche's Petition For Review And Reverse His 
Judgments Of Conviction And Sentences Because The Prosecutor Committed 
Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error, When The Prosecutor 
Argued Evidence Of Mr. Carmouche's Refusal To Permit Police To Enter His Home As 
Supporting An Inference Of Guilt Of The Charged Offenses 
A. Introduction 
The prosecutor in this case elicited testimony from police officers that 
Mr. Carmouche initially refused to permit police to enter and search his home. In 
closing arguments, the prosecutor urged the jury to consider this fact as evidence 
indicating Mr. Carmouche's guilt of the charged offenses. Although the Idaho Court of 
Appeals assumed that these facts established constitutional error that was plain on the 
face of the record, the Court of Appeals held that this error was harmless in part 
because there was additional evidence at trial that also demonstrated Mr. Carmouche 
did not want to talk to police or wish them to enter into his home. Mr. Carmouche 
submits that the Court of Appeals engaged in an incorrect analysis of the prejudice 
prong of the fundamental error test. He further submits that, under the correct legal 
standards, the evidence demonstrates a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's 
improper argument contributed to the verdict and was therefore this misconduct was not 
harmless. 
B. Standard of Review 
Because there was no contemporaneous objection to the elicitation of the 
testimony, and to the prosecutor's closing argument, that are being challenged in this 
appeal, this Court reviews Mr. Carmouche's allegation of prosecutorial misconduct 
under the three-part test for fundamental error articulated in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
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209, 226 (2010). Under this standard, fundamental error is established and reversal is 
required if the defendant can establish that: (1) the alleged error violates one or more of 
the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error is clear and obvious from 
the record; and (3) there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome 
of the trial proceedings. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. 
C. This Court Should Grant Mr. Carmouche's Petition For Review And Reverse His 
Judgments Of Conviction And Sentences Because The Prosecutor Committed 
Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error, When The Prosecutor 
Argued Evidence Of Mr. Carmouche's Refusal To Permit Police To Enter His 
Home As Supporting An Inference Of Guilt Of The Charged Offenses 
In this case, the prosecutor both elicited testimony from police officers that 
Mr. Carmouche had initially refused to permit police to enter his home, and 
subsequently argued this evidence to the jury during closing arguments as proof of 
Mr. Carmouche's guilt. Mr. Carmouche asserts that this improper questioning and 
argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level of a fundamental error. 
The prosecutor, in presenting the testimony of Officer Uriguen in this case, 
intentionally elicited testimony regarding Mr. Carmouche having invoked his Fourth 
Amendment right against the warrantless entry of the officers into his home. (Trial 
Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.39, L.1, p.39, Ls.4-14.) During closing arguments, the prosecutor 
further noted that Mr. Carmouche closed the door behind him when he first went outside 
to speak with police. (Trial Tr., p.378, Ls.6-7.) The prosecutor then argued to the jury: 
When asked about his girlfriend he had a fight with, well, she's asleep. 
You can't see her. I know my rights. You can't go in. Why? Why, if 
he came home and found her beaten this way and heard these 
stories? Would that be your response? 
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(Trial Tr., p.378, Ls.8-12 (emphasis added).) In repeatedly asking the jurors in this case 
what reason Mr. Carmouche would have for refusing to consent to let police search his 
home, coupled with asking jurors whether they - as innocent parties to the charged 
offense - would have done the same, the prosecutor was implying that 
Mr. Carmouche's invocation of his Fourth Amendment right stood as proof of his guilt. 
The direct inference to the jury was that an innocent person would not have refused to 
permit police entry to search his or her home. This was misconduct. 
As to the first prong of the Perry analysis, Mr. Carmouche asserts that the 
misconduct in this case violated his right to a fair trial and his Fourth Amendment right 
to refuse to consent to police searches. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[n]o person 
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state 
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Additionally, the Idaho Constitution also guarantees that, 
"[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 
lo. CONST. art. I, §13. Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair. 
Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated, in the context of a 
prosecutorial misconduct claim, '"Every person accused of crime in Idaho has the right 
to a fair and impartial trial."' State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(quoting State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 504 (1980)). "'It is the duty of the prosecutor to 
see that a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is 
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submitted to the jury."' Id. (quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44 (1903)). "Prosecutors 
too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that they occupy 
an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their 
statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury 
than they would give to counsel for the accused." Irwin, 9 Idaho at 44. Prosecutors 
"should not 'exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the 
verge of error, [because] generally in so doing they transgress upon the rights of the 
accused."' Id. Moreover, a prosecutor "should never seek by any artifice to warp the 
minds of the jurors by inferences or insinuations." Id. 
In Christiansen, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed a prosecutor's act of 
eliciting testimony regarding Christiansen's refusal to consent to a search of his 
business. Id. Christiansen was charged with numerous arson-related counts after his 
business burned down in the middle of the night. Id. at 464-465. During the 
questioning of one of the police officers who interrogated Christiansen, the prosecutor 
asked whether the officer asked Christiansen for permission to search the property. Id. 
at 465. The officer responded that he had and that Christiansen refused to give consent 
to the search. Id. 
On appeal, the Christiansen Court first held that although no contemporaneous 
objection was made to the testimony, the error was fundamental. Id. at 470-471. The 
Court deemed the improper testimony as being analogous to those cases where a 
prosecutor use of a defendant's silence as evidence of guilt. Id. at 470. The 
Christiansen Court stated, "The same rationale that precludes evidence of an accused's 
assertion of his or her Fifth Amendment Rights offered for the purpose of either 
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impeachment or inferring guilt precludes evidence of the accused's assertion of his or 
her Fourth Amendment rights offered for the same purpose." Id. The Court then 
concluded that the prosecutor committed misconduct in Christiansen's case: "There was 
no excuse for the prosecuting attorney seeking to elicit Sergeant Clark's opinion as to 
Christiansen's veracity during police interrogation or testimony that Christiansen refused 
consent to a search of his business premises. The prosecuting attorney's actions were 
clearly misconduct." Id. at 471. 
A prosecutor's elicitation of testimony regarding a defendant's invocation of his 
Fourth Amendment right to be free of warrantless searches, and subsequent use of that 
evidence in closing argument to support an inference of guilt, have since and 
consistently been recognized as a violation of due process that may provide the basis to 
support a finding of fundamental error. See State v. Wright, 153 Idaho 478, 488-489 
(Ct. App. 2012); State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635, 639-641 (Ct. App. 2011). The 
Wright Court noted that, "eliciting testimony from a witness regarding a defendant's 
refusal to consent to a search, when used for purposes of inferring guilt, is prosecutorial 
misconduct and may be fundamental error."3 Wright, 153 Idaho at 489. 
The use of this evidence as proof of guilt by the prosecutor during closing 
arguments in this case is similar to that present in Betancourt, as both the prosecutor's 
3 While the Wright Court ultimately found that fundamental error had not been 
established, this conclusion was only due to the fact that the defendant in Wright had 
not established the violation of any reasonable expectation of privacy that would be 
protected under the Fourth Amendment - and therefore the alleged "search" did not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment. Wright, 153 Idaho at 489-490. In contrast, the 
invocation of Mr. Carmouche's Fourth Amendment right in this case was directed 
against a search of Mr. Carmouche's home - and a "person's home 'is accorded the full 
range of Fourth Amendment protections."' See State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 523 
(1986) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966)). 
22 
remarks in Betancourt and those made by the prosecutor in this case called upon the 
jury to evaluate whether a refusal to permit police to search a premises was inconsistent 
with the actions of a person innocent of the charged offense. See Betancourt, 151 
Idaho at 639-640. These remarks were deemed in Betancourt to meet the first prong of 
the Perry test for fundamental error, "because the prosecutor's comments during closing 
argument and rebuttal violated Betancourt's right to a fair trial." Id. at 640. 
And, just as in Betancourt, the due process violation in this case is clear from the 
record. By expressly arguing Mr. Carmouche's invocation of his constitutional rights, 
and then asking the jury why he would do so if he were innocent - even more, whether 
they themselves would do so if they were in Mr. Carmouche's place - the prosecutor 
was drawing a direct line between Mr. Carmouche's invocation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights and the conclusion that he did so due to his guilt of the charged 
offense. Accordingly, the second prong of the Perry test for fundamental error has been 
met. 
Finally, contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals in this case, the improper 
argument by the prosecutor regarding Mr. Carmouche's invocation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights for purposes of inferring guilt cannot be said to be harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. From the outset, the Court of Appeals appears to have relied in 
substantial part on evidence of Mr. Carmouche's reluctance to speak with police or have 
them enter his home as proof of guilt. In support of its finding of harmlessness, the 
court cited specifically to evidence that Mr. Carmouche did not want to exit his 
residence to talk to police and that he shut the door to his residence once he did so. 
(Opinion, p.12.) This is merely further evidence of Mr. Carmouche's exercise of his 
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rights both to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment and to avoid police intrusion into 
his home under the Fourth Amendment. As has been noted, evidence of the assertion 
of one's constitutional rights cannot be properly relied upon as proof of guilt. 
Accordingly, to the extent that the Court of Appeals is seeking to rely on additional 
evidence of Mr. Carmouche's invocation of his rights when confronted by police, this 
evidence should likewise not be considered as proof of guilt. 
Moreover, the analysis conducted by the Idaho Court of Appeals in finding this 
error harmless was more akin to a sufficiency of the evidence analysis as opposed to 
the harmless error test mandated by this Court in Perry. From the outset, the Court of 
Appeals in this case framed this test as one requiring Mr. Carmouche to establish that 
the error on the part of the prosecutor actually altered the proceedings, rather than 
establishing a reasonable possibility that this was the case. The Court of Appeals 
began its harmlessness analysis with the following statement, "We nevertheless 
conclude that Carmouche is not entitled to relief because he has not established that 
the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings to his prejudice." (Opinion, 
p.12 (emphasis added).) After reciting the remaining evidence in the record that 
generally supported the jury's verdict, the court then reiterated that Mr. Carmouche had 
not shown that the misconduct at issue, "affected the outcome of the proceedings." 
(Opinion, p.12 (emphasis added).) This differs from the legal standard articulated by 
this Court, which places the onus on the defendant to show a reasonable possibility 
that the error complained of contributed to the verdict. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. 
To understand the difference between these standards, it is helpful to trace the 
"reasonable possibility" standard back to its roots in United States Supreme Court case 
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law. The most prominent application and articulation of this standard comes from the 
seminal case of Chapman v. California, in which the Court held that the standard for 
whether a constitutional error is harmless is whether there is, '"a reasonable possibility 
that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction."' Chapman v. California, 
386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)). Thus, 
the legal standard for what constitutes a harmless error appears to be the same under 
Perry for both objected-to and non-objected-to errors - the salient difference is merely 
who bears the burden of proof of prejudice and the standard of proof that is required. 
Compare Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24; Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. 
This standard, as set forth in Chapman, has its roots in the prior U.S. Supreme 
Court Opinion of Fahy. And the Fahy Court makes absolutely clear that this is not a 
test for the sufficiency of the remaining evidence to support the verdict: 
We are not concerned here with whether there was sufficient evidence on 
which the petitioner could have been convicted without the evidence 
complained of. The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility 
that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the verdict. 
Fahy, 375 U.S. at 86-87. 
In addition to conducting a prejudice analysis that was essentially a review of 
whether the remaining evidence was sufficient to convict Mr. Carmouche, which has 
been held to be the wrong standard under U.S. Supreme Court case law, the Court of 
Appeals additionally required Mr. Carmouche to actually establish that the improper 
comments of the prosecutor contributed to the verdict, as opposed to a reasonable 
possibility of such. Because the Idaho Court of Appeals applied the incorrect legal 
standards in this case, Mr. Carmouche asks that this Court grant his Petition for Review. 
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Under a proper application of the harmless error analysis under Perry, there is a 
reasonable possibility that the misconduct in this case contributed to the verdicts. There 
was substantial dispute at trial as to the source of Ms. Redmond's injuries. 
Mr. Carmouche consistently contended that they were inflicted by other individuals and 
further denied that he had struck, strangled, or otherwise threatened Ms. Redmond. 
(Trial Tr., p.326, L.8 - p.364, L.19.) By Ms. Redmond's own statements to police, "other 
people" were the source of her injuries. (Trial Tr., p.87, Ls.12-18, p.154, L.2 - p.155, 
L.7.) It was only after protracted questioning by police, who suggested Mr. Carmouche 
as the source of her injuries, that Ms. Redmond implicated Mr. Carmouche as the 
individual who inflicted her wounds. (Trial Tr., p.118, L.9 - p.119, L.25, p.154, L.2 -
p.155, L.7.) 
Additionally, the evidence at trial showed that Mr. Carmouche did not have any 
blood on his person at the time police arrived at his home, nor did he have any 
observable injuries to his hands. (Trial Tr., p.76, Ls.10-21.) Actual x-ray examinations 
of his hands that were subsequently conducted likewise did not show any injuries. (Trial 
Tr., p.286, L.10 - p.287, L.1.) This evidence casts strong doubt on the State's 
allegations that Mr. Carmouche repeatedly hit Ms. Redmond with a closed fist - by her 
estimate, over 50 times - over the course of many hours. (Trial Tr., p.76, Ls.10-21.) 
The prosecutorial misconduct in this case violated Mr. Carmouche's due process 
right to a fair trial, and was apparent from the face of the record. Moreover, given the 
conflicting evidence presented at trial as to the source of Ms. Redmond's injuries, there 
is a reasonable possibility that this misconduct contributed to the jury's verdict. 
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Accordingly, Mr. Carmouche asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct in this case rose 
to the level of a fundamental error entitling him to a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Carmouche respectfully requests that this Court grant his Petition for Review. 
If granted, Mr. Carmouche further asks that this Court reverse his judgment of 
conviction and sentences for attempted strangulation, kidnapping, aggravated battery, 
and felony domestic battery and remand this case for further proceedings in light of the 
prosecutorial misconduct that occurred in this case. 
DATED this 22nd day of January, 2014. 
SARAH TOMPKINS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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